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Despite the oft-repeated statement that the court cannot make a
will for a testator,' nevertheless in construing wills and other instru-
ments conveying property a court will sometimes raise estates by
implication even though the instrument is silent concerning them.
To enable the lawyer to draft instruments free from ambiguities and
uncertainties, to advise clients as to their rights under instruments,
and to litigate constructional questions, it is important that he know
under what circumstances a court will imply estates.
It must be remembered that the rules as to implication of estates
1. See e. g. Cornelson v. Vance, 220 S. C. 47, 58, 66 S. E. 2d 421 (1951);
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 215 S. C. 530, 537, 56 S. E. 2d 343 (1949).
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are rules of construction and not rules of law.2 A court will give
effect to the intention of the testator if it is apparent on the face of
the will; if his intention is not apparent, the court will apply a rule
of construction to ascertain his presumed intention. A rule of con-
struction operates in the law of wills and trusts as a rebuttable pre-
sumption operates in the law of evidence. 3
Since most of the cases on this topic have involved wills, this
discussion of necessity does likewise. However, some cases have
involved deeds, particularly trust deeds. Although this discussion
is based primarily on the South Carolina cases, the general rules as
to implication based principally on the English cases will be stated
on those points not yet passed on in this state.
THiS GE:NErAL PRuNClPLES
In the leading South Carolina case on estates by implication, judge
Nott thus stated the general constructional rules in two propositions:
"The first is, that in the construction of a will the intention of the
testator must always prevail. The second is, that express words are
not necessary to create an estate; but that an estate may arise, be
enlarged, controlled and even destroyed by implication." 4  Later in
the opinion, however, he stated the rules as to implication of estates
with more particularity:
. . . although the intention is to govern in the construction of
a will, that intention must be apparent either from the words or
provisions of the will, and must be consistent with the rules of
law. That an estate by implication is never allowed to issue
as purchasers. That an estate by implication is never allowed
in any case except from necessity, which must be apparent on
the face of the will, and for the purpose of carrying into effect
the manifest intention of the testator.5
Perhaps the best way to approach the problem is to see how these
general principles have been applied to particular limitations of
property. The fairly numerous South Carolina cases on implication
of estates which will be discussed fall into three groups: I. The crea-
tion of life estates by implication; II. Implication of cross limitations;
2. Perhaps the best example of the operation of a rule of law in South
Carolina is the requirement of words of inheritance in a deed to convey a fee
simple estate, for which see Means, Words of Inheritaice in Deeds of Land
it South Carolina: A Title Examiner's Guide, 5 S. C. L. Q. 313 (1953).
3. See Peoples National Bank v. Harrison, 198 S. C. 457, 469-470, 18
S. E. 2d 1 (1941).
4. Carr v. Porter, 1 McCord Eq. 60,70 (S. C. 1825).
5. Id. at 86.
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III. Remainders implied to children, issue, heirs of the body and the
like as purchasers. It should be noted that this discussion concerns
only these types of limitations and does not concern some other prob-
lems of implication, such as whether a gift of a fee in real estate, of
an absolute interest in personal property, or of stocks themselves is
to be implied from an unrestricted gift of the rents, income, or
dividends respectively.
I. THE CREATION OF LIFE RSTATES BY ImPLICATION
Perhaps the simplest case involving the problem of estates created
by implication is that of a devise "to A at the death of B." By making
the gift in that form, has the testator sufficiently manifested his in-
tention to create a life estate in B, or rather, will a rule of con-
struction say that such was presumably his intention? The answer
depends on the relationship which A bears to the testator. The old
common law authorities said that a life estate would be implied in
B only if A were the heir of the testator. 6 The reason for this re-
sult is that the testator has manifested 'his intention to exclude A
and to postpone his enjoyment of the estate in possession until the
death of B. The only way this can be done is to give A a life estate,
for otherwise A, as the testator's heir, would be entitled to the rents
and profits until B's death, which would be an absurdity or incon-
gruity.7 But the cases were clear that if the gift were "To A at
B's death" and A were not the testator's heir, but was a stranger,
then no life estate would be implied in B.8
The common law statement of the rule was obviously based on
the law of primogeniture, since it refers to "the heir." The reason
for the rule was to prevent the manifest absurdity and incongruity
which would result if the implication of a life estate were not made.
Therefore, anything which would eliminate that absurd result should
prevent the implication.9
The modem authorities state that no implication of a life estate
will be made unless the person or persons given the expressly created
but postponed estate are either the sole heir or all of the heirs of
the testator; that is, where a gift is to X group of persons at B's
death, a life estate will be implied in B only if X group is equal to
6. 2 JARMAN, WIs *532 (5th Am. ed. 1880).
7. Id. **532-533.
8. Ibid. See also Carr v. Porter, 1 McCord Eq. 60, 80 (S. C. 1825) ; Addi-
son v. Addison, 9 Rich. Eq. 58, 63 (S. C. 1856).
9. Kales, Implication of Life Estates, Distributive Construction and Dis-
position of Intermediate Income, 10 Micr. L. Rzv. 509, 510 (1912).
[Vol. I I
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the testator's heirs, no more and nro less.' 0 Thus, if X group con-
sists of some but not all the testator's heirs, no life estate in B will
be implied.-' A like result will be reached if X group contains more
than the testator's heirs, that is, all of his heirs plus strangers.'
2
The constructional doctrine of implied life estates has been rec-
ognized in South Carolina. :3  In Nicholson v. Drennan' 4 the testator
directed that his real and personal property remain as it was during
his widow's lifetime "and after her death. . . [be] equally divided
among [his] children that may be alive at the time." The Court held
that the testator's widow took a life estate by implication and there-
-fore her grantee was entitled to an injuriction against the testator's
sole surviving son's disturbing his possession. It might seem that
this case is wrong under the modern constructional rule because the
group of persons who were to take the ultimate estate was composed
of less than all the heirs of the testator since the widow was not
included. The decision was based on the rule stated in the old com-
mon law authorities written when primogeniture was the law. But
the same result has been reached in other cases where a widow and
children were involved.' 5 And since the rule is but a rule of con-
struction, the case might be justified on the grounds that since the
ultimate estate was given to children living at the widow's death,
that was a strong enough showing of the testator's intention to
create a life estate and a contingent remainder to overcome the pre-
sumptive constructional rule that no life estate would be implied.
The presence of a residuary clause in the will may change the re-
sult which would otherwise be reached under the constrdctional rules
as to implication of life estates. Thus, if the gift were to the testator's
heirs at the death of B and there were a residuary clause in which
the heirs were not included, there would be no implied life estate in
B, for the heirs are strangers to the residuary clause and therefore
10. 1 RESTATEMfNT, PROPERTY § 116 comment a (1936) ; 96 C. J. S., Wills
§ 891 (1957); 33 Air. Jun., Life Estates, Renainders, and Reversions § 17
(1941); 2 PAGo, WILLS § 930 (3rd Lifetime ed. 1941).
See the excellent statement of the rules in Equitable Trust Co. v. Johnson,
28 Del. Ch. 45, 36 A. 2d 257 (1944).
11. In re Willatts, [1905] 1 Ch. Div. 378, s. c. [1905] 2 Ch. Div. 135.
12. The leading case is Ralph v. Carrick, 11 Ch. Div. 873 (1879).
13. See Carr v. Porter, 1 McCord Eq. 69, 80 (S. C. 1825); Addison v.
Addison, 9 Rich. Eq. 58, 63 (S. C. 1856) ; Logan v. Cassidy, 71 S. C. 175,
191, 50 S. E. 794 (1905) (circuit court decree).
14. 35 S. C. 333, 14 S. E. 719 (1892).
15. Eaton v. Broaderick, 101 Miss. 26, 57 So. 298 (1912). See also Holbrook
v. Bentley, 32 Conn. 502 (1865) (to grandchildren at widow's death); Kelly
v. Stinson, 8 Blackf. 387, 390 (Ind. 1847); Rathbone v. Dyckman, 3 Paige 9,
27 (N. Y. 1831).
1959]
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would not take the intermediate rents and profits in any event.'0
One. authority goes further and suggests that these rules apply by
analogy to takers under residuary clauses so that if the gift were
a specific devise to one who was also the residuary devisee to take
effect in possession at the death of another, a life estate in the other
should be implied, since an absurdity or incongruity would result
if the residuary devisee were immediately allowed to take the rents
and profits when the will had expressly postponed his taking to the
death of the other.17
It should be stated here that the rules as to implication of life
estates apply equally to devises of real property and to bequests of
personal property including leasehold interests.' s
Another constructional problem in this area involves a limitation
of Whiteacre to A for life, and at A's death Whiteacre and Black-
acre to B, the testator's sole heir. Should A get an implied life estate
in Blackacre in addition to his express life estate in Whiteacre?
The suggested answer is no, for the testator has indicated his in-
tention to give A a life estate in Whiteacre only and therefore the
words "at A's death" are to be taken in a "distributive sense", that
is, they are to be applied only to the property in which A took an
express life estate.' 9
A. The Distribution of Intermediate Income
Suppose that there is a limitation "to A at the death of B" and
the circumstances are such that no life estate will be implied in B.
Then what disposition is to be made of the intermediate income,
Tents and profits from the testator's death until the death of B? The
answer depends on the form of the gift and the nature of the subject
matter of the gift.2 0 1) If the subject matter of the gift is specific
real or personal property, the residuary devisee or legatee is entitled
to the intermediate income, rents and profits, or if there is an intestacy,
16. 2 JARMAN, WILLS *540 (5th Am. ed. 1880), based on a dictum in
Stevens v. Hale, 2 Dr. & Sm. 22, 28, 62 Eng. Rep. 529, 531 (V. C. 1862). The
same was held in Horton v. Horton, Cro. Jac. 74, 79 Eng. Rep. 63 (K. B.
1606). See also Hudleston v. Gouldsbury, 10 Beav. 547, 50 Eng. Rep. 692 (Rolls
Ct. 1847).
17. 2 JARMAN, WILLS *540-541 (5th Am. ed. 1880), which cites no authority
for the statement.
18. Id. *544. See also Logan v. Cassidy, 71 S. C. 175, 191, 50 S. E. 794
(1905) (circuit court decree).
19. Kales, op. cit. supra note 9, 10 Micr. L. Rgv. 509, 513 (1912).
See also 2 JARMAN, WILLS **536-540 (5th Am. ed. 1880).
20. The statement of the various rules is taken largely from Kales, op. cit.
supra note 9, 10 Mich. L. Rev. 509, 514-516 (1912). These rules apply where
an intermediate estate is undisposed of for any reason.
[Vol. 11
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the heir at law or distributee will be entitled.2 ' 2) If it is a residuary
bequest of personal property only, the intermediate income must
accrue and be added to the principal and thus pass to the ultimate
legatee. 2 2 3) If it is a residuary devise of real property only, then
under the old common law and present English rule there is an
intestacy and only the heir at law can take the intermediate rents
and profits; the ultimate residuary devisee cannot take; however,
this result is doubtful today. 23  4) If the gift is a mixed residue of
both real and personal property, the intermediate income, rents and
profits must be accumulated and paid over to the ultimate beneficiary,
for by blending them, the testator has indicated his intention that
the rule as to a residue only of personal property be applied. 24  How-
ever, when the testator specifically enumerates real and personal prop-
erty in a single clause, but does not include them together in a
single blended fund, that is, if there is no true residue even though
21. Two of the leading English cases are Hopkins v. Hopkins, Cas. temp.
Talbot 44, 25 Eng. Rep. 653 (Chancery 1734) (real estate), and Haughton v.
Harrison, 2 Atk. 329, 26 Eng. Rep. 600 (Chancery 1742) (personal property).
Accord, Thomas v. Benton, 4 DeS. 17 (S. C. 1807) (personal property) ; Dray-
ton v. Rose, 7 Rich. Eq. 328, 338 (S. C. 1855) (real estate). See also Feemster
v. Smith, Rice Eq. 34,38 (S. C. 1838).
22. Green v. Ekins, 2 Atk. 473, 26 Eng. Rep. 685 (Chancery 1742) ; Hodgson
v. Bective, 1 H. & Af. 376, 71 Eng. Rep. 164 (V. C. 1863), s. c. 10 H. L. C.
656, 11 Eng. Rep. 1181 (H. L. 1864). Accord, Feemster v. Smith, Rice Eq.
34, 38 (S. C. 1838).
23. Hodgson v. Bective, Note 22 supra, is the leading English case. Al-
though Dougherty v. Dougherty, 2 Strob. Eq. 63, 68 (S. C. 1848) quotes an
English case to that effect, the result reached under the English rule would
most probably not be reached in South Carolina today should such a rare
situation be presented. According to Professor Kales, three reasons have
been given for the rule: 1) if the heir did not take so as to be entitled to the
rents and profits, the fee would be in abeyance; 2) the heir cannot be disinheri-
ted without express words; 3) prior to the time when after-acquired real estate
could be devised, a residuary devise was treated as a specific devise and the
rule of no accumulations applicable to specific devises was applied; the
English cases say that this established rule was not changed by the statute
making after-acquired real estate devisable. None of these reasons should have
any weight today. 1) The fee can descend to the heir and thus satisfy any re-
quirement of seisin and the rents and profits nevertheless go to another; the
South Carolina court has stated that if necessary, equity will make the heir
a constructive trustee of the rents and profits for the one ultimately entitled.
Dougherty v. Dougherty, 2 Strob. Eq. 63, 66 (S. C. 1848). 2) Aside from the
fact that the second reason is illogical in that it assumes the very point at
issue, the presumption against disinheritinz the heir is not very strong in this
state. See Karesh, op. cit. note 66 infra, 10 S. C. L. Q. 159, 173-174 (1957). 3)
CoME OF LAWS OP SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 19-231 which provides that after-
acquired property passes under a will should have the effect of overcoming the
third reason given by the English cases. See the excellent discussion and
criticism of the rule in Kales, op. cit. supra note 9, 10 MIcH. L. Rv. 509,
516-518 (1912).
24. Genery v. Fitzgerald, Jac. 468, 37 Eng. Rep. 927 (Chancery 1822);
Dougherty v. Dougherty, 2 Strob. Eq. 63 (S. C. 1848) (probably the leading
American case) ; Brailsford v. Heyward, 2 DeS. 18 (S. C. 1800) ; Shackleford
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the different types of property are listed in a single clause, then only
the income of the personal property accumulates and the rents and
profits pass to the heir at law.
25
II. IMPLICATION OF CROSS LrIrTATIONS
A. "To A and B and the heirs of their bodies; but if they both die
without heirs of the body, over . . ."
Suppose land is devised by the above limitation and A subsequently
dies without heirs of his body. In that case what disposition is to
be made of A's moiety? Clearly, the limitation over to the ultimate
devisees cannot tak effect, for both A and B have not died without
heirs of their bodies. The South Carolina lawyer's first reaction
would probably be that since the English Statute De Donis Condition-
alibus is not in force in this state,2 6 a fee simple conditional estate
has been created, and there would be a reverter of A's moiety to the
testator's heirs at law determined as of the time of A's death. But
such is not the law.
Under the classical English authorities, there would be an im-
plied cross remainder in tail to B, for the limitation over was in-
tended to take effect only if both A and B died without heirs of the
body; hence if only one died without heirs of the body, there would be
a partial intestacy, a hole or "chasm", in the limitation if a cross
remainder were not implied.
2 7
Although in South Carolina use of the words "heirs of the body"
in a limitation creates a fee simple conditional estate rather than a
fee tail as in England, it seems that the same result would be reached
in this state as under the English authorities: there would be an
implied cross limitation to B.28 However, this would be by way
of an executory limitation and not by way of a remainder, for a
remainder cannot follow an estate in fee simple.29
Under the earlier English cases, cross limitations would be im-
plied only between two tenants in common in tail, but later cases
hold that they may be implied among three or more. 30 In South
25. In re Drakeley's Estate, 19 Beav. 395, 52 Eng. Rep. 403 (Rolls Ct. 1854).
26. See Note, 10 S. C. L. Q. 431, 442 (1958) and the authorities cited in
footnote 70 thereof.
27. 3 JARMtAN, WLLs *536 et seq. (5th Am. ed. 1881).
28. See Gordon v. Gordon, 32 S. C. 563, 580-581, 11 S. R. 334 (1890), where
the English rule is recognized but is not applied under the facts.
29. See Note, 5 S. C. L. Q. 69, 70 (1952).
30. 3 JARMAN, WILLS **537-538 (5th Am. ed. 1881). 2 SIMEs & SMITru,
FuTuRE INTErEsTs § 843 pp. 337-338 (2nd ed. 1956).
[Vol. I I
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Carolina the number of persons taking the first estate is apparently
immaterial in determining whether a cross limitation will be implied.
3 '
B. "To A and B for life, and at their deaths to their children, and
if they both die without leaving children, over . . ."
If land were devised by the above limitation, what disposition
would be made of his interest if A died without leaving children,
leaving B surviving him? According to dicta in two South Carolina
cases, there would be a cross remainder to B by necessary impli-
cation, for nothing was given over until both A and B died without
children.3 2 It has been said that the same result might be reached
even if the word "both" were omitted, since the testator's apparent
intention is to give the whole property over as one estate to the ulti-
mate remaindermen.
3 3
However, the clear inference to be drawn from a later, more care-
fully considered case is that the doctrine of implied cross remainders
does not apply in this situation, but rather that A's estate is an
estate per autre vie, for the life of B.34
C. "To A and B as tenants in common in fee simple, and if they die
without issue, over . . ."
Suppose that both real and personal property were given by will
by the above limitation, or by one construed to the same effect, and
that A died without issue. What would be the disposition of A's
moiety? Would it pass under A's will or as intestate property of
A's, or would it go to B by way of an implied cross limitation? The
English cases limit the doctrine of implied cross limitations to cases
where the first gift to the tenants in common is for life or in fee tail;
they hold that there can be no implication of a cross limitation after
an absolute gift of real or personal property, for the testator has
entirely divested himself of all interest and therefore there could
be no partial intestacy for lack of a limitation over, and hence no
necessity exists for implying a cross limitation.3 5 This is the uni-
versal holding,3 6 outside of South Carolina.
31. See Gordon v. Gordon, 32 S. C. 563, 580-581, 11 S. E. 334 (1890).
See also Seabrook v. Mikell, Cheves Eq. 80, 88 (S. C. 1840).
32. See Baldrick v. White, 2 Bailey 442, 445 (S. C. 1831) ("children');
Seabrook v. Mikell, Cheves Eq. 80, 87-88 (S. C. 1840) ("issue").
33. See Baldrick v. White, 2 Bailey 442, 445 (S. C. 1831).
34. Richardson v. Manning, 12 Rich. Eq. 454 (S. C. 1866), discussed at
length infra pp. 364, 365.
35. 3 JAIMIN, WILLS *556 (5th Am. ed. 1881).
36. See 2 SIMaES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 843 (2nd ed. 1956) in which
it is said at page 336: "A primary requirement for the implication of cross
remainders is that the preceding gift to the tenants in common must be for
8
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In this situation South Carolina apparently goes beyond the authori-
ties elsewhere and holds that B takes a cross limitation by impli-
cation. This result was reached in an early case involving personal
property only.3 7 The principal cases on the point arose from an
early will which contained a gift in the residuary clause of both
real and personal property to the testator's two grandsons, Wilson
and Thomas, to be equally divided between them and delivered to
them at the age of twenty-one, but provided for a limitation over
"should they die, leaving no lawful issue." Wilson died under age
without leaving issue. Thomas attained the age of twenty-one, con-
veyed away a portion of the property, and died leaving children.
The will was litigated several times, and although the appellate courts
of law and equity split as to whether the issue of Thomas took an
estate as purchasers, they unanimously held that Thomas took Wil-
son's moiety by way of an implied cross limitation.38 This result
was reached despite the fact that the first estates were in fee simpleo
and was based on the following reasoning:
The testator has also said that his whole estate, and not a part,
shall go over to the ulterior remaindermen; this is saying in
other words that the limitation shall not have effect until a fail-
ure of issue of both his grandsons, which necessarily implies
that they were to take cross-remainders.
40
However, it is clear that if the property is divided into shares by
the testator, so that each share is given over separately upon the
happening of some contingency, there is no necessity for implying
cross limitations among the first takers. Thus, where property is
given "to A and B for life, remainder to their children, and if they
or either of them leave no children, then over. . ." and A dies with-
out leaving children, A's share goes over and there is no implied
cross limitation to B.41 A like result was reached in Seabrook v.
Mikel142 where a plantation was given "to A and B for life, then
life or in tail. It cannot be an absolute gift; for it is universally held that
cross limitations will not be implied to divest absolute interests. Their purpose
is to fill out a gap caused by an interstitial intestacy; and, if the first gift be
not for life or in tail but in fee, then no intestacy would occur and any such
implied limitations would merely divest a vested interest. .. ."
37. Cudworth v. Thompson, 3 DeS. 256, 4 Am. Dec. 617 (S. C. 1811).
38. Carr v. Jeannerett, 2 McCord 66, 71-72 (S. C. 1822) (per J. Bay);
Carr v. Green, 2 McCord 75, 83 (S. C. 1822) (per Chancellor Waties) ; Carr
v. Porter, 1 McCord Eq. 60, 66, 80 (S. C. 1825) (per J. Nott for combined
Court of Appeals for both law and equity cases).
39. See Carr v. jeannerett, 2 McCord 66, 69-70 (S. C. 1822).
40. Carr v. Green, 2 McCord 75, 83 (S. C. 1822) (per Chancellor Waties).
41. Baldrick v. White, 2 Bailey 442 (S. C. 1831).
42. Cheves Eq. 80 (S. C. 1840).
[Vol. I1I
9
Summerall: The Creation of Estates by Implication
Published by Scholar Commons, 1959
LAW No's
the share of each to go to his children or grandchildren, but to go
over. . . if either died under age or without leaving any children
surviving him." (Will as construed). Likewise was there no impli-
cation of a cross limitation in Boykin v. Boykin43 where land was
given to the testator's three sons in equal shares at his wife's death
with a limitation over of each son's share to his issue should any son
die before time for distribution leaving issue him surviving.
D. "To A and B for life, then the share of each to his children; but
if either A or B die under age without issue, then to the survivor
of them; and if both die without issue, over .. ."
If property were devised or bequeathed by a limitation in the above
form, what disposition would be made of his moiety if A should come
of age and then die leaving no issue? In other words, will the fact
that there is an express cross limitation to the survivor upon one
contingency (i. e., death under age without issue) prevent implication
of a cross limitation to the survivor upon another contingency (i. e.,
death without issue after coming of age)? In South Carolina, as
in England,14 the answer seemingly is no: the Court will imply a
cross limitation here to prevent a partial intestacy. 45 It may be that
in this situation the Court will prevent a partial intestacy from
arising by holding that A's estate has an estate per autre vie rather
than by holding that cross remainders arise by implication, 4 6 but
the case is nevertheless authority for the proposition that express
cross limitations upon one contingency will not prevent implication
of cross limitations on another unanticipated contingency.
E. Implication of cross limitations among stocks of issue of first
takers.
Two South Carolina cases carry the doctrine of cross limitations
by implication to the extent of implying cross limitations among
stocks of issue of the first takers, an extension of the doctrine con-
siderably beyond implying cross limitations between the first takers
themselves as in the preceding limitations. Though extreme, such
a result has been reached in other cases. 6 a
43. 21 S. C. 513 (1884).
44. 3 JAR Nts, WILs **539-542 (5th Am. ed. 1881).
45. See Seabrook v. Mikell, Cheves Eq. 80, 89 (S. C. 1840). This was by
way of dictum, for the court construed the express limitation to the survivor if
one "die under age [and] without issue" to mean if one "die under age or
without issue."
46. Richardson v. Manning, 12 Rich. Eq. 454 (S. C. 1866), discussed infra
pp. 364, 365.
46a. See 2 Simis & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 844 (2nd ed. 1956), headed
19591
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In the very early case of Sanms v. MathewS4 7 the testator had di-
vided his personal property, consisting largely of slaves, into six
shares, one for each of his children, and had given one share to his
two grandchildren by a deceased child substantially as follows: "to
my grandchildren A and B equally divided for life, then the share
of each to the issue of his body; for default of such issue of either
A or B, his share to the survivor for life, remainder to the issue of
the survivor's body; and for default of issue of both A and B, to
my right heirs." But as the facts developed, there was a hole in
the limitation despite its elaborate and apparently all-inclusive pro-
visions. A died first, leaving a daughter; B later died without issue.
The limitation over to the testator's right heirs could not take effect
because both A and B had not died without issue. Despite the fact
that the will did not provide for the situation where the survivor
died without issue, the Court held that A's daughter took the entire
estate after B's death by way of an implied cross remainder, thus
giving effect to the testator's intention to make an equal division
per stirpes among his six children and to keep each share among the
lineal descendants of each child until the line became extinct.
In Buist v. Williantsas a somewhat similar situation was presented.
For a consideration of love and affection and the release by his three
grandchildren of their claims against him concerning some slaves,
a settlor deeded land by a trust deed substantially as follows: "in
trust for my three grandchildren, A, B and C, for life, then the share
of each to his issue living at his death; but should either of them die
leaving no issue him surviving, then his share to the survivor or sur-
vivors; and if all three die without issue them surviving, over ... "
Here also the unprovided for, overlooked contingency occurred. A
died childless; B died leaving two children. C sued for a construction
of the instrument, alleging that she also would die childless and con-
tending that the property would then go as intestate property of
the settlor, since upon her (C's) death there would be no survivor of
the grandchildren and the limitation over could not take effect be-
cause one grandchild had died leaving issue him surviving. The
Court rejected C's contention and held that upon C's death, B's
issue which survived C would take the entire property, for only the
three grandchildren had furnished consideration for the conveyance
and hence the benefit was intended solely for them and their issue,
not for the testator's heirs.
"Implication of Gifts to Complete the 'General Plan' of the Testator", and the
cases there discussed and cited.
47. 1 DeS. 127 (S. C. 1785).
48. 88 S. C. 252,70 S. E. 817 (1911).
[Vol. 11
11
Summerall: The Creation of Estates by Implication
Published by Scholar Commons, 1959
LAW Novrs
It. Implication of cross remainders for life:
"To A and B for life, and upon the death of both, over to C."
Suppose that Blackacre is devised by a limitation like the above
or by a similar limitation which is construed as manifesting an inten-
tion that C not take Blackacre until the survivor of A and B dies.
Then if A dies before B, what disposition is to be made of the rents
and profits from the death of A until the death of B?
According to Professor Powell,4 9 assuming that the limitation is
construed to mean that Blackacre is not to go over to C until both A
and B are dead, there are four possible solutions to the problem which
a court may adopt: 1) There is a partial intestacy as to A's moiety,
which passes under the residuary clause of the will or. as intestate
property. 2) A and B are joint tenants for life with right of survivor-
ship; therefore B takes A's moiety by virtue of the jus accrescendi. 3)
Each life tenant has a life estate measured by two lives, i. e. until
the survivor of A and B dies; therefore, when A dies, his estate has
an estate per autre vie which passes as those estates do.5o 4) A and B
are tenants in common of life estates with cross remainders implied
between themselves; therefore A's moiety goes to B.
Since the jus acrescendi (right of survivorship) has been abolished
by statute as an incident of the estate of joint tenancy in South Caro-
lina,5 1 we may reject the second alternative above at the outset. And
due to the strength of the presumption against intestacy, the Court
has rejected the first alternative.5 2 Therefore we are left with a
choice between the third and fourth alternatives.
The English rule 53 and probably the majority rule in the United
States is that cross remainders between the tenants in common for
life will be implied 54 and thus B in our hypothetical example would
take the entire rents and profits until his death. Dicta in two South
Carolina cases indicate such a result. In Baldrick v. White the Court
said:55 "If property were given to two for life, and at their deaths
to their children, if both should die without leaving children, then
49. 2 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 324 (1950).
50. See note 58 infra.
51. CODE oF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 19-55.
52. Richardson v. Manning, 12 Rich. Eq. 454, 458-461 (S. C. 1866) (decree
of circuit chancellor).
53. 3 JARMAN, WILLS *554 (5th Am. ed. 1881).
54. 33 Am. .uR., Life Estates, Remainders, land Reversions § 83 (1941);
1 RESTAT M NT, PROPERTY § 115 (1936); 5 AM. LAW PROP. § 21.35 (1952);
2 POWELL, REIAL PROPERTY § 324, p. 707 (1950); 2 SI,s & SMITH, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 843 pp. 333-334 (2nd ed. 1956); 2 PAGE, WILLS H9 930, 1125
(3rd Lifetime ed., 1954 Cune. Supp.); ANNoT., ANN. CAS. 1916B 713.
55. 2 Bailey 442, 445 (S. C. 1831).
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over, here would be cross remainders [between the life tenants] by
necessary implication; nothing being given to the remaindermen
over, until the death of both without children." This statement was
repeated in Seabrook v. Mikel. 5 6
But, although the point is not entirely free from doubt, the rule
in South Carolina is probably otherwise and is that an estate per autre
vie results. In Richardson v. Manning5 7 the residue of the testator's
estate, both real and personal, was given to his executors in trust to
keep it together "during the joint lives of my two brothers, John
P. Richardson and Thomas C. Richardson, and that they divide the
net proceeds of said real and personal estate annually between my
said two brothers, share and share alike. . . . At the death of my
two brothers . . . the whole of the real and personal estate ... [is
to] be divided between my three nephews. . . ." John P. Richard-
son, one-time governor of South Carolina, died first leaving his
brother Thomas surviving him. Thomas filed a bill in equity in his
capacity as executor and trustee against the testator's distributees
and heirs at law, the executors of his brother John, and against the
remaindermen under the will to have it determined who was entitled
to the net proceeds of the trust after John's death. The Court con-
strued the trust estate to endure for the lives of both John and
Thomas; hence the limitation over could not take effect until the
death of the survivor. The Court held that no cross remainders be-
tween the life tenants were to be raised by implication, for there was
no necessity for it; but rather that the estate of John, the deceased
life tenant, bad an estate per autre vie which passed to his executors
in the absence of a devise of it by him and in the absence of a special
occupant. 5 s
The reason given by the circuit chancellor for not implying cross
56. Cheves Eq. 80 (S. C. 1840).
57. 12 Rich. Eq. 454 (S. C. 1866). According to SHEPARD'S SOUTH CARO-
LINA CITATONS, this case has never been cited.
58. The manner in which an estate per autre vie passes is regulated by
statute. CoDI OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 19-202 provides that an
estate for the life of another may be devised. CODE OF LAWS OV SOUTH CARO-
LINA, 1952 § 19-708, which was the twelfth section of the original Statute of
Frauds, provides in substance that if it is not devised, it goes to the special
occupant, if any, and is chargeable in his hands as assets by descent; and
if there be no special occupant, it passes to the life tenant's executors or
administrators and is assets in their hands.
BALLANTINI , LAW DICTIONARY p. 1220 (2nd ed. 1948) thus defines
a "special occupant": "Where land has been granted to a man and his heirs
for the life of another, and the grantee dies before the cestui que vie, the
grantee's heir may enter and occupy the land as one having a special and
exclusive right to do so; not by right of inheritance, but by the very terms of
the grant. The heir who thus goes into possession is called special occupant.
See 2 B1. Comm. 259."
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remainders between the life tenants was that where a testator mani-
fests his intention to give the whole property over at one and the
same time as one estate, the court would imply cross remainders to
bring the estate together, but here the estate was held together in
the trustees until the death of the surviving life tenant and therefore
there was no necessity for implying cross remainders. 59 The lower
court thus seemed to draw a distinction between legal and, equitable
life estates and to hold that cross remainders will be implied between
the life tenants where their interests are legal, but that where they
are equitable, an estate per autre vie results. However, the holding
of the Court' of Appeals was much broader and indicates that in no
event would cross remainders be implied.6 0 The Court further indi-
cated that the same rules of descent and conveyance apply to legal
estates and to the interests of cestuis que trust.0 1 This indicates
quite clearly that the same constructional rule should apply to legal
and equitable life estates as to whether cross remainders will be im-
plied or an estate per autre vie will result, for the greater includes
the lesser. Indeed, there seems to be no logical reason to draw a
distinction between legal and equitable life estates in this situation,
for in either case the primary inquiry is the same: what is to be the dis-
position of the intermediate income between the death of the first life
tenant and the survivor?
Other jurisdictions have reached the same result as Richardson
v. Manning in cases involving the intermediate income of trust funds
when one of two or more life tenants has died.
6 2
G. Implication of cross limitations in deeds
The rule has often been stated in the cases that although cross
remainders will be raised by implication in a will, they cannot be in
a deed.0 3 The Restatement, however, takes the position that cross
59. Richardson v. Manning, 12 Rich. Eq. 454, 463-464 (S. C. 1866).
60. Id. at 480-481: "There is nothing in the cases mentioned in the decree,
nor in other cases that have been cited here, nor in the learning applicable to
joint tenants and tenants in common, nor in the scheme of the will, nor in
the motives which have been attributed to the testator, that would war-
rant a decision, either that the estate of the trustees was determined by the
death of one brother, or that cross-remainders between the two brothers were
raised by implication, so that the moieties of both are now united for the bene-
fit of the survivor." (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 483: "[Wle will consider the case ... as subject, being a trust,
to the same rules of descent and conveyance which would apply to it if it
was a legal estate."
62. ANNOT., 140 A. L. R. 841, 854-858 (1942).
63. 26 C. J. S., Deeds § 113 p. 930 n. 79 (1956) ; 18 C. J., § 290 (1919);
33 Ai. Jui ., Life Estates, Remainders, and Reversions § 84 (1941); ANNOT.,
ANN. CAS. 1916B 713, 717.
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limitations will be implied in both deeds and wills.8 4 It points out
that the common law rule not allowing the implication in deeds is
based on very weak authority and on faulty reasoning.0 5 The princi-
pal reason given for the distinction is the presumption against in-
testacy in the case of a will. However, this presumption is balanced
by the contrary presumption that a will is not to disinherit the heir.06
Moreover, the rule that a deed is to be construed most strongly against
the grantor 6 7 provides sufficient reason for making the implication
in deeds. The English equity rule is that the implication will be made
in deeds of marriage settlements.0 8 Thus, some modern authority
favors making the implication in deeds.6o
While the point seems never to have been raised in South Caro-
lina, it is quite possible that this state would follow the modern liberal
rule and make the same implications of cross limitations which would
be made in cases of wills in cases of deeds, for one of the most ex-
treme cases on implied cross limitations in this state involved a trust
deed.7 0 However, since a more liberal rule of construction is applied
to trust deeds than to others, 7 ' it might be that cross limitations will
not be implied in deeds other than trust deeds. 72
III. RZMAINDERS IMPLID TO CHILDRZN, IssUE, HEIRS ov THn BODY
AND TiH LIKE AS PURCHASERS
Probably the most difficult constructional problems of all involve
the word "issue." And the area of estates by implication is no
exception. The fairly numerous South Carolina cases involving the
problem of estates by implication to children, issue, heirs of the body
and the like may be grouped into three classes of limitations: A. "to
X, but if he die without issue, over . . ."; B. "to X for life, but if
he die without issue, over . . ."; C. "to X and his issue, but if he
64. 1 RESTATEarONT, PROPERTY § 115 comment a (1936).
65. Monograph, Implication of Cross Remainders in Deeds, I RmSTATIMNT,
PROPERTY, Appendix 16 (1936).
66. Recently recognized in this state in Rikard v. Miller, 231 S. C. 98,
109, 97 S. E. 2d 257 (1957), discussed in Karesh, Survey of South Carolina
Law: Wills, 10 S. C. L. Q. 159, 173-174 (1957).
67. See Coleman v. Gaskins, 165 S. C. 301, 304, 163 S. t. 790 (1932) and
the cases therein cited.
68. Twisden v. Lock, Arab. 663, 27 Eng. Rep. 430 (Chancery 1768); In
re Stanley's Settlement, [1916] 2 Ch. Div. 50.
69. See also 33 Am. JuR., Life Estates, Remzainders, and Reversions § 84
(1941).
70. Buist v. Williams, 88 S. C. 252, 70 S. E. 817 (1911) (cross limitations
implied between stocks of issue of first takers).
71. See First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Deschamps, 171 S. C.
466, 477-480, 172 S. E. 622 (1934) (Rule in Shelley's Case). See also Means,
op. cit. supra note 2, 5 S. C. L. Q. 313, 328-337 (1953) (words of inheritance).
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die without issue, over. . . ." In considering the South Carolina
law on such limitations as these, it should be noted that two separate
questions are really involved: 1) Does a remainder arise by impli-
cation? 2) Is a fee simple conditional estate created?
A. "To X, but if he die without issue, over .. ."
If land were devised by the above limitation, what disposition
should be made if X died leaving issue? A plausible argument might
be made that the testator's unexpressed intention was that X's issue
take the remainder and that the court should imply a remainder to
effectuate the testator's intention. A small minority of American cases
have so held.73 However, probably the English rule7 4 and certainly
by far the American majority rule is that no such remainder is to be
far the American majority rule is that no such remainder is to be
implied in this situation for the reason that since the estate in X is
a fee simple, to imply a remainder would be in effect to construe the
limitation to X as a life estate with alternative contingent re-
mainders. 75 Therefore, some cases in construing such a limitation
lay stress on whether the first estate is a fee simple expressly, as "to
X and his heirs . . .", or a fee simple only by virtue of statute or
construction.76
On the first question, the South Carolina law is entirely clear: no
remainder arises by implication in this situation. The point was
settled by the early and leading case of Carr v. Porter.7 7 The tes-
tator had left the residue of his estate "to be equally divided between
my grand sons Willson and Thomas, and delivered to them at the
age of twenty-one years; but should they die, leaving no lawful issue,"
then over. Willson died under age without issue; Thomas attained
twenty-one and thereafter died leaving several children. In the
extensive litigation in which the will was involved, the Court of
Errors (law) held that no remainder would be implied ;78 the Court
of Appeals (equity) reached a contrary result, following its own
precedent in a prior unreported case involving the same will,7 9 and
73. 22 A. L. R. 2d 177, 229 (1952).
74. A.iNor., 22 A. L. R. 2d 177, 234-238 (1952). Ex parte Rogers, 2 Madd.
449, 56 Eng. Rep. 400 (V. C. 1816) is contra, but has been disapproved in
later cases.
75. 1 SIMES & SUITH, FUTUR INTERESTS § 532 p. 512 (2nd ed. 1956), 2 id.
§ 842 p. 330. ANNOTS, 22 A. L. R. 2d 177, 209 et seq. (1952); 51 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 485, 489 (1914J.
76. See ANNOTS., 22 A. L. R. 2d 177, 224-226 (1952) ; 51 L. R. A. (N. S.)
485, 493-496 (1914).
77. 1 McCord Eq. 60 (S. C. 1825).
78. Carr v. Jeannerett, 2 McCord 66 (S. C. 1822, Jan. term).
79. Grant v. Thompson, referred to in 2 McCord 75, 77 (S. C. 1822).
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held that Thomas took only a life estate with contingent remainder
to his issue by implication.8 0 Thereafter, the Court of Appeals was
created and vested with appellate jurisdiction in both law and equity
zases; it followed the law court precedent in holding that no remainder
would be implied to the issue, and laid down the general principle
"'[t]hat an estate by implication is never allowed to issue as pur-
chasers." 8' However, that general rule was stated more broadly
than the facts of the case warranted, for the Court said that an estate
could never arise by implication except from necessity, 8 2 and that
here no necessity existed. The principal reasons for the decisions
were that since the first estate was in fee simple, it was not open
to the Court to construe it to be a mere life estate;8 3 and also that
if it were construed to be a life estate with contingent remainder to
issue of the life tenant, the Rule in Shelley's Case would apply to give
the life tenant a fee simple conditiomil or fee tail,8 4 and hence the
remaindermen could not take as purchasers in any event.
The result in Carr v. Porter had been reached in an earlier case
involving personal property,8 5 and has been followed in later cases
involving personal property8 o and real property.8 7 The reasons have
been admirably stated by Chancellor Dargan :88
In this case the issue of A. do not take as purchasers, because
nothing is intended to be granted to them in the words of the
direct gift. Their existence or non-existence at the death of
A., like any other contingent event, is simply made the condi-
tion upon which the remainder to B. depends.
As to the second question, whether a fee simple conditional estate
is created in this situation, despite a dictum in Carr v. Porter to the
contrary,8 9 the later cases are quite clear that a fee simple conditional
estate does not arise. 0 Rather, a fee defeasible estate is created,
80. Carr v. Green, 2 McCord 75 (S. C. 1822, Nov. term).
81. Carr v. Porter, 1 McCord Eq. 60, 86 (S. C. 1825).
82. Id. at 79.
83. Id. at 76-77.
84. Id. at 81.
85. Cudworth v. Thompson, 3 DeS. 256, 4 Am. Dec. 617 (S. C. 1811).
86. Manizault v. Holmes, Bailey Eq. 298 (S. C. 1829): Hay v. Hay, 4
Rich. Eq. 378 (S. C. 1852); O'Dom v. Davis, 7 Rich. 536 (S. C. 1853). See
Waller v. Ward, 2 Speers 786 (S. C. 1844); McLure v. Young, 3 Rich. Eq.
559, 578 (S. C. 1851). See also Folk v. Varn, 9 Rich. Eq. 303 (S. C. 1857).
87. Shaw v. Erwin, 41 S. C. 209, 19 S. E. 499 (1894); Drummond v.
Drummond, 146 S. C. 194, 143 S. E. 818 (1928).
88. Hay v. Hay, 4 Rich. Eq. 378, 382 (S. C. 1852).
89. 1 McCord Eq. 60, 81 (S. C. 1825). See also Cudworth v. Thompson, 3
DeS. 256, 259, 4 Am. Dec. 617 (S. C. 1811) (personal property).
90. Bedon v. Bedon, 2 Bailey 231 (S. C. 1831); Edwards v. Edwards, 2
Strob. Eq. 101 (S. C. 1848) (deed).
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defeasible upon the first taker's dying without issue.9 ' The general
principle has often been stated that a fee conditional cannot arise by
implication.
9 2
B. "To X for life, but if he die without [issue], over
Suppose land were devised to X for life by the above limitation with
a limitation over in the event that he died without children, issue or
heirs of his body. Then if X died leaving persons fitting that de-
scription, would they take a remainder by necessary implication?
Many courts, probably a majority in the United States, hold that
a remainder arises by implication on the ground that this is an obvious
case of an incomplete testamentary disposition which the court will
complete by supplying a remainder in accordance with the testator's
unexpressed though probable intention. 9 3 The English cases take
a hybrid position and hold that no remainder will be implied in this
situation ". . . unless additional features of the will render that con-
clusion necessary." 9 4
However, South Carolina clearly and uniformly holds that no
remainder will be implied here.9 -  In one will which was twice lit-
igated the limitation was "to X for life, and if he die without heirs
of the body," then over (as construed). The ingenious argument
was advanced that a remainder should be implied in the heirs of
A's body which the Rule in Shelley's Case converted into a fee
simple conditional in the life tenant. The Court rejected this argu-
91. Bedon v. Bedon, 2 Bailey 231 (S. C. 1831).
92. See, e. q., Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill Eq. 265, 282 (S. C. 1833); Barber
v. Crawford, 85 S. C. 54, 59, 67 S. E. 7 (1910); Bomar v. Corn, 150 S. C.
111, 116, 147 S. E. 659 (1929); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Monk, 165 S. C.
111, 114, 162 S. E. 911 (1932).
93. 1 SIa!Es & SMIT, FUTURE INTERESTS § 532 (2nd ed. 1956); 2 id. §
842; 3 RtSTA'~tENT, PROPERTY § 272 (1940) ; 33 Ams. JUR., Life Estates, Re-
mainders, and Reversions § 63 (1941); ANNoT., 22 A. L. R. 2d 177, 186-195
(1952).
94. ANNOT., 22 A. L. R. 2d 177, 203-204 (1952).
95. Lawrence v. Burnett, 109 S. C. 416, 96 S. E. 144 (1918), s. c. 116
S. C. 347, 108 S. E. 142 (1921) ("die without child"); Wood v. Wood, 132
S. C. 120, 128 S. E. 837 (1925) (die without "surviving legitimate children").
See Manigault v. Holmes, Bailey Eq. 298 (S. C. 1829) (personal property)
(die without issue) ; Addison v. Addison, 9 Rich. Eq. 58, 61 (S. C. 1856) (real
and personal property) (construed die without issue) Shaw v. Erwin, 41
S. C. 209, 19 S. E. 499 (1894) (die without "child or children"); Monk v.
Geddes, 159 S. C. 86, 156 S. E. 175 (1930) (die without "heirs" construed
die without "heirs of the body" or "children") ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Monk,
165 S. C. 111, 162 S. E. 911 (1932) (same will as above). See also Davis v.
Hodge, 102 S. C. 178, 183, 86 S. E. 478 (1915) ("die without heirs or chil-
dren of their own body"); Murchison Nat. Bank v. Mclnnis, 153 S. C. 382,
389, 150 S. E 895 (1929) (dissent) ("die without issue"). Contra: Harkey v.
Neville, 70 S. C. 125, 135, 49 S. E. 218 (1904) (dictum, criticized in con-
curring opinion at p. 137).
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ment and held that A took only a life estate and that no remainder
would be implied in the heirs of his body.90 6
As to whether a fee simple conditional estate is created in X, the
matter is somewhat more complicated. In Carr v. Porter the Court
said by way of a dictum that X would take a fee simple conditional
in this situation, by analogy to the English fee tail estate.o? This
result was reached in Addison v. Addison.98 The testator there had
died in 1850 leaving real and personal property to his son X for
life "[b]ut if my said son . ..should die without leaving any child
or children", then over. The will contained no residuary clause.
The son X died leaving a child G, so the limitation over could not
take effect. The Court refused to raise a remainder by implication
in G, the life tenant's son. The situation was thus presented that
G could not possibly take unless his father had taken a fee simple
conditional estate. The Court, however, relied heavily on the pre-
sumption against intestacy and held that the limitation over should be
construed as upon an indefinite failure of issue, despite the word
"child or children" which would normally lead to the definite failure
of issue construction; hence the estate in X was enlarged from a
life estate into a fee conditional in the land and an absolute estate
in the personal property, which passed per forliam doni to his child
in the case of the land and by inheritance as to the personalty.09
However, the result reached in Addison v. Addison was changed
by the Act of 1853100 which adopted the definite failure of issue
construction. That case was in effect overruled by a case subsequent
to the Act. In Harkey v. Neville' 0 land was devised to A for life,
then to B for life, and in case of B's death without issue, over.
The Court said that the Act of 1853 required the limitation to be
read as it had said ". . . to B for life, and in case of her death with-
out issue living at the time of her death," then over; hence the Court
held that a fee simple conditional estate was not created in B.
It is open to some doubt as to how far the Act of 1853 has changed
96. Monk v. Geddes, 159 S. C. 86, 156 S. E. 175 (1930); Prudential In-
surance Co. v. Monk, 165 S. C. 111, 162 S. E. 911 (1932).
97. 1 McCord Eq. 60, 75-76 (S. C. 1825), relying on Knight v. Ellis, 2
Bro. C. C. 570,29 Eng. Rep. 312 (Ch. 1789).
98. 9 Rich. Eq. 58 (S. C. 1856).
99. Id. at 63 the Court stated the reasons for the result.
100. CoDm OF LAWs oV SOuTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-3. "Whenever in any deed
or other instrument in writing, not testamentary, or in any will of a testator,
an estate, either in real or personal property, shall be limited to take effect
on the death of any person without heirs of the body, issue or issue of the
body, or other equivalent words, such words shall not be construed to mean
an indefinite failure of issue, but failure at the time of the death of such
person."
101. 70 S. C. 125,49 S. E. 218 (1904).
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the common law preference for the indefinite failure of issue con-
struction. The scholars suggest that the statute merely creates a
rebuttable presumption and that the common law indefinite failure
of issue construction would apply if the testator used rather explicit
language to that effect.1o2 No South Carolina cases on this precise
point have been found; the Court seems to assume that it is bound
by the definite failure of issue construction.
One case may give difficulty in this area. The limitation in Bonds
v. Hutchison1° 3 seems indistinguishable from that in Harkey v.
Neville,3'0 4 which was cited to the Court,1 0 5 but the Court in the
former case nevertheless held that a fee simple conditional estate was
created, and not a mere life estate. The grounds for such a holding
were not made entirely clear, but two alternative grounds have been
suggested:106 1) The Court applied the indefinite failure of issue
construction to enlarge the life estate into a fee conditional; 2) the
Court implied a remainder to the bodily heirs of the life tenant and
applied the Rule in Shelley's Case to enlarge the life estate into a
fee conditional. The first alternative would seem to be precluded by
the Act of 1853 and by the case of Harkey v. Neville. The second
alternative is believed by the leading textwriters 107 and by this
writer to be the true grounds for the decision, since the cases which
the Court relied on most heavily involved the Rule in Shelley's
Case.' 0 8 If this be the ground, the case is opposed to the holding
in prior cases to the effect that no remainder will be implied in this
situation to make the Rule applicable and thus enlarge the life
estate into a fee conditional.10 9 Moreover, the opinion does not
indicate when the will in question was executed, whether before or
after October 1, 1924 at which time the Rule in Shelley's Case was
abolished in certain respects and particulars."10 The case is con-
trary to the precedents and seems itself extremely weak as a precedent;
102. Warren, Gifts Over on Death Without Issue, 39 YAE L. J. 332, 340
(1930), cited and adopted in 1 SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 526 p.
497 (2nd ed. 1956).
103. 199 S. C. 197, 18 S. E. 2d 661 (1942).
104. 70 S. C. 125, 49 S. E. 218 (1904).
105. See synopsis of argument for respondents, Bonds v. Hutchison, 199
S. C. 197, 198 (1942).
106. See 1 Simrs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERFSITS § 532 p. 512-513 fn. 94 (2nd
ed. 1956).
107. Id. § 531 p. 509 fn. 85.
108. 1. e., Dukes v. Shuler, 185 S. C. 303, 194 S. E. 817 (1938) ; Lucas v.
Shumpert, 192 S. C. 208, 6 S. E. 2d 17 (1939).
109. Cases cited in note 96 mpra.
110. CODE or LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-2.
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it may fall within that class of cases thus characterized by Mr.
Justice Cothran :111
.. . it was manifestly an instance of those controversies as to
the result of which both parties are agreeable, and which they
are anxious to have consummated, a class of cases which are
extremely dangerous, and of little weight as precedents.
C. "To X and his issue, but if he die without issue, over . .."
A line of cases beginning with Henry v. Stewart1 2 which construe
limitations of the type above have firmly established an apparent
exception to the general rule that remainders are not to be implied
to issue as purchasers. Thomas Bell bequeathed slaves "to X [his
daughter] and the lawful issue of her body; and if she die without
lawful issue of her body surviving her, over." X died leaving three
children surviving her and the question arose as to what estate, if
any, they took in the slaves. The Court held that X took only a life
estate with remainder to her issue surviving her as purchasers.
3.
The Court's reasoning seems to be essentially that since the word
"issue" was used in the direct gift, the testator clearly intended some
benefit to the issue. If it were real property, a gift to one and his
issue would create a fee tail in England [a fee simple conditional in
South Carolina] which the issue would inherit per formam doni and
thus take the benefit. But the same language which would create
such an estate in land creates an absolute estate in the first taker in
personal property. Hence, the Court would defeat the testator's in-
tention to benefit the issue if it applied the strict constructional rules
which govern limitations of real property to those of personal property.
So where personal property is involved, it will seize on any language
which indicates that "issue" was not used in its broad sense but
rather in the restricted sense of "issue living at death." The limi-
tation over will be given that effect, and will restrict the generality
of "issue" as used in the primary gift. Thus, the limitation over
upon death without issue surviving cuts down the first estate to a
life estate, rather than creating an absolute interest, with a remainder
to issue living at the life tenant's death. 114
For the Court to reach this result, it must find that in a gift "to
111. Thomson v. Ehrlich, 148 S. C. 330, 348, 146 S. E. 149 (1928), discussing
Barbot v. Thompson, 94 S. C. 3, 77 S. E. 716 (1913).
112. 2 Hill 328 (S. C. 1834).
113. Henry v. Stewart, 2 Hill 328 (S. C. 1834); Henry v. Archer, Bailey
Eq. 535 (S. C. 1837).
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X and his issue", "issue" means "issue living at his death."n 5 It
thus depends upon the limitation over being on a definite failure of
issue. In some cases following what we may term the Rule of
Bell's Will the limitation over has been expressly upon failure of
issue living at the first taker's death." 6  In others the Court has
had to resort to other language to reach that construction, as in
those cases where the limitation over is to a survivor of the first
taker upon failure of his issue.117
All of the cases applying the Rule of Bell's Will to limitations
of personal property have been based on limitations effective before the
Act of 1853138 took effect which abolished the indefinite failure of
issue construction. That statute should have the effect of creating
a life estate with a remainder any time personal property is limited
to one and his issue with a limitation over if he die without issue." 9
It should be noted that the Rule of Bell's Will has been applied
both to deeds of personal property' 20 as well as to wills.' 2 '
However, later cases have placed two restrictions upon the opera-
tion of the rule. First, not only must the limitation over be valid
under the Rule Against Perpetuities, i. e. be upon a definite failure
of issue, but it must also otherwise be an effectual limitation over.
Thus in Hay v. Hay' 22 where personal property was limited "to X
and the heirs of her body, and if she die without living issue of her
body, then over to the nearest heirs of my body by my mother's
lineage," the Court held that although the limitation over was upon
a definite failure of issue, it was void for uncertainty since a limi-
tation over to such a group of persons was meaningless and hence
X took an absolute estate. Second, the limitation over must be
solely upon the contingency of a failure of issue; if it is upon failure
of issue coupled with another contingency or with another alternative
contingency, the first taker takes an absolute estate. Thus, in Waller
v. Ward12 3 where personal property was bequeathed "to X and his
115. See, e. g., the references to "Bell's will" in Hay v. Hay, 3 Rich. Eq.
384, 386 (S. C. 1851), 4 Rich. Eq. 378, 387 (S. C. 1852); Moore v. Paul,
7 Rich. Eq. 358, 369 (S. C. 1855).
116. Cases cited in note 113 supra; also McLure v. Young, 3 Rich. Eq. 559
(S. C. 1851).
117. Templeton v. Walker, 3 Rich. Eq. 543 (S. C. 1850); Nix v. Ray, 5
Rich. 423 (S. C. 1352); Mendenhall v. Mower, 16 S. C. 303 (1881).
118. See note 100 supra.
119. See Mendenhall v. Mower, 16 S. C. 303, 316 (1881).
120. Cases cited in note 117 supra.
121. Henry v. Stewart, 2 Hill 328 (S. C. 1834); Henry v. Archer, Bailey
Eq. 535 (S. C. 1837); McLure v. Young, 3 Rich. Eq. 559 (S. C. 1851);
Simons v. Bryce, 10 S. C. 354 (1878).
122. 4 Rich. Eq. 378 (S. C. 1852).
123. 2 Speers 786 (S. C. 1844).
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issue, and if he die under age and without issue surviving him,
then over," the Court held that the Rule in Bell's Will applied only
if the limitation over and issue were alternatives and that here X
took an absolute interest.' 2 4 The case has been followed.'
2 5
Thus, the Rule of Bell's Will is well established as to the con-
struction of limitations of personal property. And the Court has
considered devises of real property as if it were applicable. 1 20 And
a strong dictum in Mendenhall v. Mower' 2 7 makes it applicable to
both, saying that there is generally no difference in construing lim-
itations of real and personal propertyL2 8 and that in this situation it
would make no difference.' 2 9 However, in that case although the
Court considered it as involving real property all the way through the
opinion, at the end it said that it was really personal property as the
order of the circuit court settled.' 3 0 All the cases involving limita-
tions of this type of real property have held that a limitation "to X
and his issue, but if he die without issue living at his death" creates
a fee simple conditional in X, with nothing in his issue as pur-
chasers.' 31 Of course, this is based on a finding that the word "issue"
was used as a word of limitation.' 3 2 But in a limitation to one and
his issue, whether by deed' 33 or will' 3 4 "issue" is prima facie used
as a word of limitation and not of purchase and a fee conditional
results unless other language shows that "issue" was used as a word
of purchase.' 3 5 And in a limitation like that under discussion, it is
hard to see how "issue" could be used except as a word of limitation.
Thus, it seems clear that the Rule of Bell's Will does not apply
to limitations of real property so as to create a remainder in the
issue as purchasers. The Court construes the primary gift and the
gift over entirely separate and apart from each other,'13 so that
124. Id. at 794-795 the Court stated the result would be the same whether the
limitation over were on the contingency that X "die under age or without
leaving issue" or "die under age and without leaving issue".
125. O'Dom v. Davis, 7 Rich. 536 (S. C. 1853).
126. See DeHay v. Porcher, 1 Rich. Eq. 266 (S. C. 1845), which, however,
did not follow the Rule in Bell's Will.
127. 16 S. C. 303 (1881).
128. Id. at 309.
129. Id. at 316.
130. Ibid.
131. Hay v. Hay, 3 Rich. Eq. 384 (S. C. 1851) : Bethea v. Bethea, 48 S. C.
440, 26 S. E. 716 (1897) ; Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Wells 172 S. C.
1, 172 S. E. 707 (1934). See Selman v. Robertson, 46 S. C. 262, 26, 24 S. E,
187 (1896) ; Mattison v. Mattison, 65 S. C. 345, 43 S. E. 874 (1903).
132. See Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Wells, 172 S. C. 1, 7, 172 S. E.
707 (1934).
133. See Means, op. dt. supra note 2, 5 S. C. L. Q. 313, 350, n. 135.
134. Id. n. 134.
135. Id. at 351, n. 136.
136. See Hay v. Hay, 3 Rich. Eq. 384, 390 (S. C. 1851).
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the Act of 1853 restricting the generality of "die without issue" in
the limitation over has no effect whatsoever on the construction of
the word "issue" in the primary gift.
137
HENRY SUmmiRAL, JR.
137. Bethea v. Bethea, 48 S. C. 440, 443, 26 S. E. 716 (1897).
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